By Quentin Lauer
Quentin Lauer is without doubt one of the top writers on Hegel. learn his different books too. specially the "Essays in Hegelian Dialectic" between others.
Hegel is tough to appreciate in the beginning, Mr. Lauer makes the duty a section more uncomplicated. even if extra introductory fabrics should be wanted for many readers sooner than this one is learn.
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Extra resources for A Reading of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit
412. ). This is "the negation of consciousness which cancels out (aufhebt) in such a way that it retains and preserves what has been canceled, and, thus, survives its cancelation" (p. 145/234/188). What has happened is that in the experience of consciousness which is self-consciousness is involved the realization that self-consciousness is nonsense if it is not that of a living being; life is essential to self-consciousness. Thus, to reflect on consciousness and leave life out of the picture is to have as an object "the simple I" (p.
56 There is, thus, a separation between "itself as an autonomous object and this object as object of a consciousness which makes it its own being" (p. 151/242/197). All this split consciousness can do is withdraw into itself, seeking refuge in what is clearly its own, its thinking. "We" who look on, however, see that in 56 "In the master-slave situation, there is neither education, nor progress, nor historyonly the repetitive fulfillment of the master's wants" (Kelly, "Hegel's 'Lordship and Bondage,'" in MacIntyre, Hegel, p.
Sensation, then, is most certain of its object because the senses present that object with utmost immediacy. In fact, however, consciousness soon finds out that its certainty is illusory since it cannot say of what it is certain, and that its immediacy, too, is illusory since unless the subject sensing confer meaning there is no meaning to what it does say. This sort of consciousness may or may not be a "natural" function; the point is that not only can it not be satisfied with its own apprehension of its object, it must negate whatever satisfaction it appeared to have and move on to a more adequate stage.